

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



## THESIS

**FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF A FAULT  
TOLERANT COMPUTING SYSTEM:  
A TMR MICROPROCESSOR SYSTEM DESIGN OF 64-BIT  
COTS MICROPROCESSORS**

by

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March 2001

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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and determine the feasibility of implementing a fault tolerant computing system that is able to function in the presence of radiation induced Single Event Upsets (SEU) by using the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) technique with 64-bit Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) microprocessors.

Due to the radiation environment in space, electronic devices must be designed to tolerate the radiation effects. While there are radiation-hardened devices that can tolerate radiation effects, they offer lower performance and higher cost than COTS devices. On the other hand, COTS devices offer lower cost, orders of magnitude higher performance, shorter design time and better software availability and compatibility. However, COTS devices are susceptible to the radiation effects. In order to use COTS devices in space environment, a fault tolerance technique such as TMR needs to be implemented.

This thesis presents the design and analysis of a TMR 64-bit COTS microprocessor implementation. The system incorporates three 64-bit microprocessors, the memory system including SRAM and PROM memory modules and the programmable logic devices that are used to implement the TMR technique. The validity of the design is verified by the timing analysis conducted on read and write operations.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT .....	2
B.	SINGLE EVENT PHENOMENA (SEP).....	3
1.	Single Event Latchup (SEL).....	4
2.	Single Event Transient (SET).....	4
3.	Single Event Upset (SEU) .....	4
4.	Single Event Burnout (SEB).....	5
C.	COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) VS. RADIATION HARDENED DEVICES .....	5
1.	Cutting Edge Technology .....	6
2.	Faster Design-to-Orbit Time .....	6
3.	Reduced Cost .....	7
D.	PURPOSE .....	7
E.	THESIS ORGANIZATION .....	9
II.	BACKGROUND.....	11
A.	FAULT TOLERANCE .....	11
1.	Software Redundancy .....	12
2.	Passive Redundancy .....	13
3.	Time Redundancy .....	13
4.	Hardware Redundancy.....	14
a)	<i>Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)</i> .....	14
B.	TMR MICROPROCESSOR DESIGN.....	17
1.	Processor Selection .....	17
2.	Hardware Design.....	18
3.	Fault Detection and Recovery .....	20
C.	DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION .....	21
III.	MICROPROCESSOR SELECTION.....	25
A.	CHARACTERISTICS & CRITERIA.....	26
1.	COTS vs. RadHard .....	26
2.	CISC vs. RISC .....	27
3.	Size, Pinout, Power .....	27
4.	Bus Width.....	28
5.	Speed.....	28
B.	REVIEW OF CURRENT MICROPROCESSORS .....	29
C.	CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED MICROPROCESSOR .....	30
1.	System Control Coprocessor (CP0) .....	32
2.	Floating Point Coprocessor (CP1) .....	33
3.	CPU Core .....	33
4.	Instruction and Data Caches .....	34

5.	System Interface .....	34
IV.	HARDWARE DESIGN .....	37
A.	MICROPROCESSOR AND LATCHES .....	37
1.	Microprocessor .....	38
2.	Latches.....	39
B.	MEMORY SPACE.....	40
1.	PROM.....	42
2.	SRAM .....	42
V.	PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC DESIGN.....	45
A.	FPGA DESIGN.....	47
1.	FPGA Selection.....	47
2.	Address/Control Voter, Memory Decoder FPGA .....	48
a)	Address/Control Voter.....	48
b)	Memory Decoder .....	51
c)	Memory Control/Memory Enable Signals .....	52
3.	Data Voter/Transceiver FPGA.....	54
B.	PLD DESIGN.....	57
1.	PLD1 .....	57
a)	Counter .....	58
b)	Cycle End (CYCEND*).....	58
c)	ValidIn* .....	59
d)	Write Enable Signals.....	59
2.	PLD2.....	61
a)	Read Ready (RdRdy*).....	61
b)	Write Ready (WrRdy*) .....	62
VI.	SYSTEM TIMING ANALYSIS.....	63
A.	READ CYCLES .....	63
B.	WRITE CYCLES.....	66
C.	TIMING ANALYSIS .....	68
VII.	CONCLUSIONS AND FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH .....	71
A.	CONCLUSIONS.....	71
B.	FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH .....	72
1.	Completion of TMR Hardware Implementation .....	73
2.	Hardware-Software Integration .....	73
3.	Radiation Testing .....	74
	APPENDIX A. TMR DESIGN SCHEMATICS .....	75
	APPENDIX B. PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC DESIGN EQUATIONS .....	85
1.	PLD Programming Equations.....	85
2.	FPGA Programming Equations .....	86
	APPENDIX C. XILINX FOUNDATION SERIES FPGA DESIGN .....	87
1.	Address/Control Voter FPGA .....	87

2.	Data Voter FPGA .....	96
LIST OF REFERENCES .....		101
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....		103

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## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. Three-Bit Majority Voter Logic Diagram from Ref. 11. ....	15
Figure 2.2. Basic TMR Circuit Implementation from Ref. 11. ....	16
Figure 2.3. Tripled TMR Voters from Ref. 11. ....	16
Figure 2.4. Simple R3081 Board Design from Ref. 2. ....	19
Figure 2.5. TMR R3081 Board Design from Ref. 1. ....	19
Figure 2.6. TMR FIFO Interface from Ref. 1. ....	21
Figure 2.7. TMR R3081 Block Diagram from Ref. 2. ....	23
Figure 3.1. RC4650 Block Diagram from Ref. 13. ....	32
Figure 3.2. Typical RC4650 System Architecture from Ref. 13. ....	36
Figure 4.1. Virtual Memory Segments supported by RC4650 from Ref. 13. ....	41
Figure 5.1. Three-bit Majority Voter/Error Detector from Ref. 2. ....	50
Figure 5.2. One-bit Slice of the Transceiver Logic Design from Ref. 2. ....	56
Figure 6.1. TMR RC4650 Top Level Schematic .....	64
Figure 6.2. Read Timing Diagram.....	65
Figure 6.3. Write Timing Diagram.....	66
Figure A.1. TMR RC4650 Top Level Schematic.....	76
Figure A.2. One of the three microprocessors and the associated latches.....	77
Figure A.3. Address/Control Voter FPGA with PLD1 and PLD2 .....	78
Figure A.4. Data Voter FPGA Pinout .....	79
Figure A.5. PROM Memory Block .....	80
Figure A.6. KRAM and SRAM0 Segments of SRAM Memory Block .....	81
Figure A.7 SRAM1 and SRAM2 Segments of SRAM Memory Block.....	82
Figure A.8 SRAM3 Segment of SRAM Memory Block.....	83
Figure C.1. Address Voter/Memory Decoder Section of Address/Control Voter FPGA .	88
Figure C.2. Control Voter Section of Address/Control Voter FPGA.....	89
Figure C.3. Memory Interface Section of Address/Control Voter FPGA .....	90
Figure C.4. 4-bit Wide Majority Voter Macro (VOTER4) .....	91
Figure C.5. One 30-bit Address Bus Input Macro.....	92
Figure C.6 Voted Address Bus Output Macro .....	93
Figure C.7 9-bit Wide Majority Voter Macro (VOTER9) .....	94
Figure C.8 9-bit System Command (Control) Bus Input Macro .....	95
Figure C.9. Top Level Schematic of Data Voter FPGA.....	97
Figure C.10. One 64-bit Data Bus Input Macro .....	98
Figure C.11. 64-bit Voted Data Bus Output Macro .....	99
Figure C.12. 16-bit Wide Majority Voter Macro (VOTER16) .....	100



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## LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1. 3-Bit Majority Voter Truth Table.....	15
Table 3.1. List of Candidate Microprocessors.....	29
Table 4.1. Address Range of Memory Segments supported by RC4650 from Ref. 13.....	41
Table 5.1. Chip Select Memory Map from Ref 2.....	52
Table 5.2. Byte Write Enable Strobes Assertion Table.....	60

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The effects of radiation on electronic devices to be used in critical systems forced system designers to use radiation hardened devices to avoid the penalties of having system malfunctions due to those effects. However, the cost of using those special parts introduced itself as the reduced performance, higher cost and less availability and compatibility. Those problems combined with the shrinking budgets for developing systems directed designers towards switching to Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products instead of radiation hardened devices. In order to utilize COTS devices in a radiation environment, a method of increasing the reliability of the system has to be employed to overcome the susceptibility of those devices to transient radiation effects. One such method emerging from the research efforts in this area is Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR).

A previous project at the Naval Postgraduate School in this area produced a fault tolerant computing testbed implementing the TMR technique using a 32-bit microprocessor. The results of this project verified the feasibility and validity of implementing the TMR technique. The objectives of this research are to analyze and determine the feasibility of implementing a 64-bit TMR microprocessor system design, to design a sample system and to verify the correct operation thereof. The research began with the selection of a 64-bit COTS microprocessor suitable for this system. The selected microprocessor, IDT 79RC4650, met all the criteria except being resistant to destructive radiation effects, which cannot be addressed by employing the TMR technique. Since the

devices used in a TMR implementation must be resistant to destructive radiation effects, further testing is necessary before final selection of the microprocessor.

The next phase of the design was to determine the configuration of the hardware design to accommodate the TMR technique and the design of the programmable logic devices. The programmable logic design space included PLDs and FPGAs. The design and simulation of FPGAs was accomplished using the Xilinx Foundation Series design tool. On the other hand, PLDs were designed but not simulated by using a design tool.

After the completion of the design and simulation of programmable logic devices, a thorough timing analysis of the whole system was conducted. The final analysis proved that the system works correctly and the design of a complete fault tolerant computing system featuring TMR implementation is feasible. The analysis also gave an initial estimate of the performance penalty due to the implementation of the TMR concept. Thus, the benefits of using low-cost, better-performance COTS devices vice radiation-hardened devices have been justified.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Nations all around the world are trying to decrease their defense expenditures since the end of the Cold War without sacrificing the capabilities of their equipment. In spite of the improvements in development of cost-effective systems, military equipment has always been expensive both in cost and design time due to the special requirements necessary to operate under extreme conditions. One example is the electronic equipment that is used in space environment and exposed to the high rates of radiation. Under budget restrictions, it has been crucial to find alternative ways to decrease costs and improve performance of electronic devices. One way is to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices instead of radiation-hardened (rad-hard) devices. COTS devices dramatically cut the research and development costs, reduce design time, drop overall system costs, offer much better system performance and compatibility with other systems and software when compared with radiation hardened devices. In addition, radiation hardened devices have limited availability and come at a high cost. On the other hand, COTS devices are more susceptible to radiation effects such as total dose and Single Event Upsets (SEU) since they are not developed to operate under these conditions.

This thesis is a follow-on work to a multi-thesis project conducted by Lieutenant Payne [Ref. 1], Captain David Summers [Ref. 2], Lieutenant Damen Hofheinz [Ref. 3] and Captain Kim Whitehouse and Lieutenant Susan Groening [Ref. 4] who designed and implemented a fault tolerant computer evaluation system using a 32-bit Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) microprocessor. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the



possibility of implementing a similar system using a modern 64-bit COTS microprocessor and to do the initial design of such a system.

#### **A. THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT**

The space environment imposes requirements on and defines characteristics of devices that are intended to operate in space. The risk posed by the space environment to electronic devices is mainly in the form of radiation, and special precautions must be taken to protect electronic devices from malfunctioning under the effect of this radiation.

Radiation is the emission or propagation of waves or particles. It is the biggest concern about reliability in space applications that this project is taking into consideration. High-energy charged particles can cause damage or disruptions in microelectronic devices. These particles are either ions or photons. Ions, except for the neutron, have both a charge and mass associated with them. There are basically two types of ions: light ions, and heavy ions. Light ions have a very low mass, such as protons, which are hydrogen atoms with the electron missing, and alpha particles, which are helium atoms with both electrons missing. Heavy ions are any element heavier than helium with one or more electrons missing. Unlike ions, photons have neither mass nor charge. They are very short wavelengths of electromagnetic energy, such as X-rays and gamma rays. [Ref. 5]

There are several elements contributing to the radiation effects near the Earth. The largest contributor to a device's total dose is from particles trapped in the Earth's geomagnetic field. These trapped particles form an area known as the Van Allen Belts. Any satellite in orbit is subject to effects from the Van Allen Belts. Another contributor

is solar particles. Due to the high temperatures of the sun, many particles have enough energy to escape the sun's gravity. Those particles continuously flow across the Earth in what is called the Solar Wind. Another source of radiation is galactic cosmic rays. These are heavy ions produced by events, such as exploding stars, outside our solar system. [Ref. 5]

The effect of radiation on electronic devices can be divided into three kinds of phenomena: Total Dose Effects, Dose Rate Effects and Single Event Phenomena (SEP). The first two are calculated to assist in determining the survivability of electronic equipment designed to operate in space environment. The first factor is the total dose, the total amount of radiation the device will be exposed to during its lifetime. Device failures caused by total dose are called Total Dose Effects. The second factor is the dose rate, the amount of radiation the device is exposed to per unit time. Dose Rate Effects are the device failures caused at a particular dose rate where the device fails to function. SEP will be discussed in the next section. [Ref. 6]

## **B. SINGLE EVENT PHENOMENA (SEP)**

SEPs occur when a high-energy particle passes through the microelectronic device and deposits enough charge to cause a transistor to change state. In most cases, the transistor only changes state long enough for the charge to be absorbed back into the system and then resumes its original state. The transistor's state change can lead to latchup in parasitic transistors, high current state in a power transistor, or can be latched into a storage element. The four main types of SEP in Complimentary Metal Oxide Semiconductors (CMOS) are discussed in the following sections. [Ref. 6]

### **1. Single Event Latchup (SEL)**

When CMOS field effect transistors are fabricated near each other on a single chip, one of the unwanted byproducts is a pair of vertical bipolar junction transistors. An SEL is caused when a charged particle passes close enough to this circuit to bias the two parasitic transistors on. This creates a very low impedance path to ground, which has two possible outcomes. If the current drawn through the parasitic transistors generates more heat than the device can dissipate, it will be destroyed. On the other hand, even if the device can dissipate the heat, the large amount of current drawn through the parasitic transistors prevents the remainder of the circuit from operating correctly, which is a non-destructive SEL. One example of a non-destructive SEL is that of a hung system, which requires a system reset for recovery. [Ref. 6]

### **2. Single Event Transient (SET)**

Single Event Transients are unexpected changes of a short duration in the output value of a combinational logic circuit due to the influence of a charged particle. SETs are not destructive. They only adversely affect the system if the pulse change due to a SET is near the clocking edge and is long enough to meet the setup and hold times of the next storage unit in the cascade of stages. If the SET meets these criteria, then it manifests itself as a Single Event Upset (SEU). [Ref. 7]

### **3. Single Event Upset (SEU)**

An SEU is any unwanted change of value in a memory cell, whether it is a latch, register, or cache cell, that is caused by charge introduced into the circuit by radiation. This is the kind of SEP that this and the previous thesis works are trying to address. In

microprocessors, SEUs are usually categorized into one of two error types: program flow errors and data errors. Program flow errors are errors that occur in the program counter (PC), control logic, or any other register that deals with the state of the processor. Data errors are usually confined to the registers and data cache. These two types of errors are not necessarily exclusive. A data error could occur in a register that is later used as a jump address. When the processor jumps to the address held in that register, it is in the wrong location and begins to execute incorrect code. [Ref. 7]

#### **4. Single Event Burnout (SEB)**

Single Event Burnout is another condition that can cause device destruction. It is caused by a single ion, for example from a galactic cosmic ray, which induces a high current state in a MOSFET destroying the circuit. [Ref. 6]

#### **C. COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) VS. RADIATION HARDENED DEVICES**

The radiation effects discussed in the previous section, with the exception of SETs and SEUs, are destructive in nature. The best way of reducing their effects is mainly by using radiation-hardened devices or providing shielding. A radiation-hardened device is one that is specifically designed to be able to withstand higher amounts of radiation than standard commercial parts. On the other hand, not all COTS devices are eligible to be used in space applications. COTS devices that are going to be used in space need to have a certain level of radiation hardness against destructive effects such as SEB and SEL. This requires testing COTS devices to determine if they can withstand the specified amount of radiation. Once this requirement is satisfied, COTS devices can be used in

applications that incorporate fault tolerance techniques, such as TMR, to provide protection against non-destructive effects such as SEUs.

Determining the suitability of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) microprocessors to be used in space applications is a subject of ongoing research. There are multiple reasons for utilizing a COTS product within such a harsh environment as space. This section gives additional insight into the rationale behind those reasons.

### **1. Cutting Edge Technology**

Companies developing and marketing radiation-hardened devices are on the decline. Without government budget support for research into this area, there is not sufficient demand from commercial sector customers to motivate companies to invest large amounts of money in research on these devices. For those reasons, the technology of radiation-hardened devices is lagging behind state-of-the-art technology by up to two or more generations. As an example, the highest performance radiation hardened microprocessor available is a 66 MHz 486 processor while a state of the art COTS processor such as the Intel Pentium III, AMD K-6 II, or a RISC design can run at clock rates in the GHz range. This is a whole order of magnitude or more difference in processor capability. [Ref. 8]

### **2. Faster Design-to-Orbit Time**

Parts availability is crucial in maintaining a development schedule. Because the radiation-hardened device market is not a big and fast growing market, radiation-hardened device manufacturers do not readily stock the parts. This causes a delay in the design and test phase of the project. With a move toward COTS devices, the order delay

is completely erased. Most of these devices are available from multiple manufacturers, which give the designer more choices. In addition, use of COTS devices allows for part compatibility and interchangeability in case of failures. Additionally, data on radiation testing for more and more COTS devices are becoming available to help the designer make an informed decision on the correct part to use depending on the environment the device is to be placed in. [Ref. 8]

### **3. Reduced Cost**

Lack of profit is one of the main reasons only a small number of companies are manufacturing radiation-hardened devices. The low demand for these devices keeps the price hundreds of times higher than the commercial models for several different reasons. Since radiation hardened devices employ different techniques in their design to reduce the susceptibility to effects from ionized particles, they tend to be larger than the non-hardened devices. This lowers the number that will fit on the wafer in the first place and increases the probability that the devices will have defects both of which can be attributed as contributors to lower yield. Since the demand for commercial devices is much higher, the manufacturer can adjust the fabrication process in order to increase the yield, which results in lower cost to the consumer. The best alternative is the development of hardware and software fault tolerant designs with COTS devices. [Ref. 5] [Ref. 9]

### **D. PURPOSE**

The goal of this research is the design of a fault tolerant computer system using a 64-bit COTS microprocessor that is able to accurately compute in the presence of

radiation induced SEUs. This work does not address error detection and correction (EDAC) of memory systems, which has been previously researched. [Ref. 10]

There are two major benefits from this study. First, the system can act as a fault tolerant software testbed. The system is exposed to ion beam radiation to generate SEUs and monitored for an SEU. When one is detected, a time stamp is generated and the Operating System is observed in its handling of the error. This allows the testing of the software algorithms in the environment they were designed to operate in without the expense of being placed in orbit.

The system can also be used as a hybrid fault tolerant computer system. In this use, the processor is also monitored for an SEU. When one is detected, the faulty data is corrected in the processor and it continues to execute its instructions from the corrected data. A major advance in this implementation is the ease with which the error can be corrected. The normal mode in these types of systems has been to just reset the processor when an SEU was detected, effectively losing all computations done up to the time of the SEU. The concept in this project reduces the recovery time by using the interrupt service routine support to restore the processors to a fault-free state. Once an SEU is detected, the processors are interrupted and the operating system interrupt service routine takes over. The interrupt service routine conducts a context switch on the processors and all processors are loaded with the majority voted and presumably error-free context. After returning from the interrupt routine, the processors begin execution in lock step again.

## **E. THESIS ORGANIZATION**

The organization of this thesis follows closely to the design approach used in developing the system. Chapter I has been a brief introduction into the environment that the system will be operating in. Chapter II is background material on research that set the foundation for this design. Chapter III explains the process of selecting the 64-bit COTS microprocessor used in this design. Chapter IV presents the hardware design of the system and points out changes from the previous design. Chapter V contains the design of the programmable elements of the system, which include the Voter Modules and the Memory Controllers. Chapter VI explains the system timing analysis and Chapter VII presents the conclusions developed during this research and discusses topics for follow-on work.



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## **II. BACKGROUND**

The study of fault tolerant computing systems has been going on for many years. A digital system, though very reliable, does not operate fault free. When a system experiences a fault, it has to be detected and corrected. The technology of computer systems has progressed at a rapid rate and fault tolerance requirements didn't get enough attention for the sake of speed or performance. However, the use of fault tolerant designs in systems that perform critical tasks, such as the control system of an aircraft or a missile guidance system, is crucial. [Ref. 11]

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader a brief background for this project and the key issues that make it important. The chapter starts by describing the general concept of fault tolerance and focuses in on the design on which this system was based.

### **A. FAULT TOLERANCE**

There are two approaches to increase the survivability or reliability of critical electronics for space applications, which are radiation hardening and the use of fault tolerance. The first method, radiation hardening of devices, is simply constructing devices in such a way as to increase the total dose survivability and reduce the possibility of an SEP. This method would relate to the designing of a system with fault avoidance by utilizing parts with a high reliability. This system design has increased radiation tolerance, but offers little or no redundancy.

The second method, fault tolerance, is simply the ability of the system to functionally operate in the presence of a fault. Reliability is determined by the design of

the system, the parts utilized, and the operating environment. One method of increasing reliability is by employing the worst-case design, using high quality components, which in turn adds cost. An alternative method of improving system reliability is to use a fault-tolerant design. Fault tolerance is usually achieved by increasing the redundancy of parts or systems. Fault tolerance can be accomplished in either software or hardware. This section will discuss the redundancy methods that are relevant to this design, which are time, software, passive, and hardware redundancy. [Refs. 11]

### **1. Software Redundancy**

No matter how capable the programmer, almost all software contains faults. A way to achieve some level of protection from these faults is the implementation of a software redundancy method. One such method is N-version programming, which is the addition of software modules to provide checks. For example, five individual programs are designed for the same function. They are all executed, and their outputs are voted upon. Additional methods of software redundancy are consistency checks of the data against known correct values and capability checks to ensure those functional programs are operating correctly. [Ref. 11]

A subset of software redundancy is error-correcting codes. These codes can be utilized to provide automatic fault detection. Two good examples of information redundancy are the parity bit and the Hamming Code. The parity bit is a single bit appended to the data set that allows for error detection. Parity can either be even or odd. If even parity is selected, the number of ones in the data set and the parity bit should add up to an even number. If odd parity is selected, the ones should add up to an odd number.

If they do not, there is an error in the information. The limit of the parity bit is its inability to determine which bit is in error. The Hamming Code appends multiple bits to the data set, which allows for error detection and correction by pointing out the faulty bit. The additional bits appended by the Hamming Code are actually weighted parity bits. By determining which Hamming Code bits are in error, the faulty data bit can be determined and corrected. [Ref. 11]

## **2. Passive Redundancy**

Passive redundancy employs multiple units, some of which are not continuously operating and are command selectable. In this configuration, redundant items act in response to a specific failure or anomaly. The detection of a fault is achieved by conducting periodic tests, employing self-checking circuits or watchdog timers. Passive redundancy allows mission operations to continue in the presence of one or more failures. [Ref. 11]

## **3. Time Redundancy**

Time redundancy is one of the easiest methods to implement; it involves the restoration of a system to the last saved point immediately after experiencing a fault. This fault is detected by placing checkpoints and with a timeout mechanism. If the system fails to perform a task within a certain amount of time, a fault is detected. The restoration of the system is accomplished by rollback of either instructions, segments of programs, or entire programs to the last checkpoint. The problem with this method is that it can be time consuming, which is determined by the size of the program and memory that is restored.

Additionally, there is a loss of information from the point that the system last saved data. [Ref. 11]

An alternative method of time redundancy is the performance of a calculation numerous times for accuracy. This requires the system to save the state before the calculation, perform the calculation and save it, make a context switch back to the beginning of the calculation, perform it again, and then compare the results of the two different calculations. This results in a large computational drain on the system and two-fold increase in calculation time. [Ref. 11]

#### **4. Hardware Redundancy**

There are basically three forms of hardware redundancy: passive, dynamic, and hybrid. Passive redundancy uses fault masking to keep the fault from propagating out of the current process. This is implemented using multiple modules and voting hardware. It does not require any actions from the system or operator. Dynamic redundancy monitors the outputs of the modules looking for faulty units. When one is detected, the system removes the faulty unit from the system and replaces it with a good one if it is available. The hybrid approach uses portions of both the passive and dynamic approaches. [Ref. 11]

##### ***a) Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)***

A subset of passive hardware redundancy is the Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) system. As the name implies, the TMR system takes the outputs of three replicated modules and compares them in a voting unit. The voting unit passes the most common input to the output, essentially masking out any single fault. The heart of a TMR system, the voting unit, and its truth table are shown below in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1.




Figure 2.1. Three-Bit Majority Voter Logic Diagram from Ref. 11.

A	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
B	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
C	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
OUT	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1

Table 2.1. 3-Bit Majority Voter Truth Table

The table shows that anytime two or more inputs have the same logic value, either a zero or a one, that value is propagated to the output. The concept of TMR can be expanded to include multiple modules to produce an N-modular redundant system. As N gets larger, the logic required to realize the circuit and the added levels of delay get prohibitively large. Typically N is held to three or five.

As stated before, by placing the three modules in parallel and voting their outputs, a TMR circuit can be implemented. The basic TMR circuit is shown below in Figure 2.2. The inputs and output of the modules do not have to be single bits. There can be X inputs and Y outputs associated with each module. All that needs to be done is to

place  $Y$  single bit voters in parallel, connected such that they vote each of the respective  $Y$  outputs.




Figure 2.2. Basic TMR Circuit Implementation from Ref. 11.

The single voter on the output of the TMR system is a single point of failure. That is, if the voter fails and generates or propagates an error, then the error will be propagated throughout the circuit. This could become a major problem in cascaded circuits. To solve this problem, the voters at the end of each stage can also be tripled. An example of this is shown in Figure 2.3. [Ref. 11]




Figure 2.3. Tripled TMR Voters from Ref. 11.

## **B. TMR MICROPROCESSOR DESIGN**

The framework for the system implemented in this work was originally designed and simulated by Lieutenant John C. Payne, Jr., USN, as a Fault Tolerant Computing Testbed using the Verilog design suite. Following this, Captain David Summers, USMC improved, implemented and fabricated the design and Lieutenant Damen Hofheinz, USN continued implementation and testing of the testbed. The remainder of this section is a brief synopsis of the TMR Testbed Design. For a more detailed explanation, please see Ref. 1, Ref. 2 and Ref. 3.

### **1. Processor Selection**

Lt. Payne began his design with the logical step of selecting a microprocessor. In his selection process he took into account such factors as COTS vs. Radhard, CISC vs. RISC, size, pinout, power, bus width, memory size, speed, and multiple chip vs. single chip implementations. His research led him to select the MIPS R3081 RISController produced by Integrated Device Technologies (IDT). This device was selected over AMD's AM29000 and AM29050; IBM and Motorola's PowerPC 603e, 604e, and 750; and IDT's R36100, R4650, and R5000. The determining factor for selecting the R3081 was the availability of radiation environment performance data because the processor had to be latch-up resistant. The R3081 was tested in a space experiment by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) to measure SEU and total dose effects on the processor. Another factor was the compact size of the R3081 due to its small number of pins. A detailed description of the R3081 can be found in Ref. 12.



## 2. Hardware Design

With the processor selected, the next step was to integrate all the peripheral components required for the R3081 to function as a TMR computer system. For comparison purposes, a block diagram of a single processor system and a TMR system are provided on the following page in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5, respectively.

From comparison of Figures 2.4 and 2.5, the architecture of the TMR implementation has relatively few changes from the single processor design. The major additions are CPU B and CPU C along with the Address, Data, and Control Voters.

The processors are connected in such a way that the Operating System acts as if there is only one processor in the system. The processors are kept in lock step from boot up by executing the same instructions in parallel. The processors' Address, Data, and Control busses are then routed to their respective voters. The voters perform a majority vote on the signals and pass them on to the Memory Space and Memory Controller as in a single processor system. If an error is detected in a voter, the Memory Controller generates an interrupt. [Ref. 1]




Figure 2.4. Simple R3081 Board Design from Ref. 2.




Figure 2.5. TMR R3081 Board Design from Ref. 1.

### 3. Fault Detection and Recovery

The voters allow the fault generated in one of the processors to be masked out and the bus cycle to complete correctly, but that does not completely remedy the situation. The processor that had the error is now out of synchronization with the other two processors. That is where the Interrupt Handler comes into play.

When a voter detects a miss compare on its inputs, it signals the Memory Controller, which asserts an interrupt input to the processors. The Interrupt Handler resets the invalid processor in a very simplistic way. It starts by saving the processors' internal registers to memory. Since all three processors will be executing the instructions to save the internal registers, the Data Voter will mask out the invalid data from the corrupted CPU. The Interrupt Handler then reloads the processors' internal registers from memory. This puts the corrupted processor back into synchronization with the other two processors. The Interrupt Handler then acknowledges the interrupt and returns from the exception. The processors then continue execution with the next instruction.

In order to determine which processor was corrupted, the internal registers of each processor must be examined. The data must be captured prior to being voted or the error is lost. By placing First-In-First-Out (FIFO) Registers on the address, control, and data busses between the processors and voter, each processor's internal state can be captured in its corresponding FIFO. The arrangement is shown below in Figure 2.6.




Figure 2.6. TMR FIFO Interface from Ref. 1.

### C. DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION

Lieutenant Payne's design and simulations was the framework for the concept of the TMR system. His design product was the software verification in Verilog of his implementation of TMR. The thesis presented by Captain David Summers, [Ref. 2], describes the implementation of the TMR design in hardware and the required changes. Finally, the thesis presented by Lieutenant Hofheinz, [Ref. 3], completes the hardware implementation and shows the results of the preliminary testing of the testbed. The following paragraphs will provide a brief overview of these design changes and further information regarding them can be found in Ref. 1, Ref. 2 and Ref. 3.

The process in the design of any system is driven by many factors including part availability and compatibility. The three major changes Captain Summers was required to implement in order to provide a working board for future test and space applications were the addition of a system controller FPGA and I/O interface ports. The system controller FPGA was added to replace some of the functionality provided by the computer in the Verilog design of Ref. 1. The I/O interface was added to provide the means to upload programs and control the board during testing.

The design and manufacture of the TMR board were completed by Captain Summers, but he was unable to complete the programming of the System Controller FPGA, and testing and verification of the overall design. Lieutenant Hofheinz continued and completed this follow-on work as part of the preparation of the board for eventual cyclotron testing and space-based applications. The follow-on work carried out by Lieutenant Hofheinz included the design and implementation of the system controller FPGA as well as doing the preliminary tests and verification of the system functions. These design changes are highlighted and shown in Figure 2.5.

The joint efforts of Lieutenant Payne, Captain Summers and Lieutenant Hofheinz proved the fundamental concept and produced a working example of a TMR system. Beginning with the next chapter, the design of a new TMR system using 64-bit microprocessors is presented.




Figure 2.7. TMR R3081 Block Diagram from Ref. 2.

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### III. MICROPROCESSOR SELECTION

The intent of this thesis is to take another step in the design and implementation of a fault tolerant TMR system by using 64-bit COTS microprocessors. The benefits of using COTS parts and implementing the TMR concept using them have been mentioned in the previous chapter. The benefit expected from this work is the performance improvement of the TMR system by further exploitation of the power of COTS devices. One of the features of a microprocessor that is expected to enhance performance is the address/data bus width. The wider the bus width is, the more data is processed per bus cycle. The growing number of applications using 64-bit microprocessors and the wide range of 64-bit microprocessors available supports the rationale for this work. This thesis was driven by that challenge of whether a more capable and current microprocessor could be used in the TMR design and the necessary changes to the current design in order to accommodate that kind of microprocessors.

This chapter presents the process of microprocessor selection. The system design depends on the type of microprocessor to be used, so the first step is to select the microprocessor. The challenge in selecting a microprocessor was the availability of a wide range of 64-bit microprocessors. In order to reduce the number of candidates and focus in on the best choice, certain criteria had to be brought up and employed. The following sections explain the criteria used for the selection of the microprocessor to be used, the variety of microprocessors available and their characteristics, and the characteristics of the microprocessor that was selected and used in this design.



## **A. CHARACTERISTICS & CRITERIA**

The first step in microprocessor selection is to set up the criteria on which the selection process is to be based. The characteristics of different microprocessors are reviewed and the decision is made on which microprocessor best suits the design at hand. The criteria consisted of considerations such as COTS vs. rad-hard, CISC vs. RISC, size, pin-out and power consumption, performance, bus width and compatibility to the previous system.

### **1. COTS vs. RadHard**

As discussed previously in Chapter I, the availability, cost and performance of COTS devices compared to rad-hard devices present significant advantages in using COTS devices. First of all, COTS devices tend to be state-of-the-art and therefore more capable than rad-hard devices. Second, COTS devices are widely available and they offer a wide variety to the designer. Third, rad-hard devices often have uncertain delivery time, which adds to the overall system design time. These devices often must be specially ordered from a limited number of vendors due to declining rad-hard device market. On the contrary, COTS devices, as the name implies, are available over the counter in a short time. Fourth, the software support and compatibility for COTS devices is better than rad-hard devices. Usually, the software must be specially designed for rad-hard devices and thus, is less proven, more expensive and takes more time to develop. Finally, the cost of rad-hard devices are multiple times higher than that of COTS devices which have multiple times better performance compared to their rad-hard counterparts.

However, COTS devices have disadvantages, too. First of all, the techniques used to design fault-tolerant systems utilizing COTS devices require the use of both part redundancy and physical shielding which contribute to the overall system cost, weight and space restriction on the board. Second, while some COTS devices may have hardness levels of 100 kRads or more, this hardness varies greatly from device to device and is less proven than rad-hard devices. Third, in many cases, the safety and reliability specifications for military applications cannot be met by COTS devices. Lastly, as the semiconductor industry changes technology and the devices get smaller, faster and more complex, they are becoming more susceptible to radiation.

## **2. CISC vs. RISC**

Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) machines are designed to reduce the number and complexity of instructions in the microprocessor, thus allowing a reduction of actual hardware complexity. The simpler the hardware, the less susceptible it is to radiation-induced failures. RISC machines take advantage of caching, prefetching, pipelining and superscalar methods to improve performance while CISC machines are unable to take full advantage of these due to their variable-length, complex instructions.

## **3. Size, Pinout, Power**

The size of the device determines the physical space requirement. Since the weight and space constraints are critical limitations in space applications, smaller devices with smaller number of pins are preferred. Many devices have reduced number of pins by having multiplexed address and data busses. Similarly, power consumption is another

critical factor to take into consideration when selecting a device to be used in space applications where power is a precious commodity.

#### **4. Bus Width**

The bus width of COTS devices follows the current trends. Although many systems still effectively employ 32-bit microprocessors, the current trend is towards 64-bit busses to improve the performance of the machine by increasing the amount of data processed in each cycle. While some manufacturers realize this transition by offering microprocessors with flexible bus width that can be switched between 32 bits and 64 bits, the others offer strictly 64-bit architectures.

Although the 64-bit architecture brings increased power consumption and hardware complexity, the performance benefits of using a 64-bit microprocessor, which is increasingly finding more commercial applications and growing its market share, weighs heavier.

#### **5. Speed**

One of the most important factors in selecting a microprocessor is its speed which is basically the clock rate the machine runs at and which has considerable effect in determining overall system performance. However, the speed, thus the system performance, will be limited by the additional propagation time introduced by the voting and control logic in a TMR design. The processor chosen for this design may not have the highest speed available in the market due to the performance penalty of TMR technique but should still introduce a performance leap when compared to the R3081 TMR design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3.

## B. REVIEW OF CURRENT MICROPROCESSORS

As part of this research, several microprocessors were analyzed based on the criteria discussed in the previous section. The microprocessor to be selected would obviously be a COTS device due to their numerous advantages explained earlier in detail. So there was no need to include rad-hard devices in this process. Table 3.1 contains data concerning the various microprocessors that were considered. These are all RISC processors because the first criteria employed in selection process was the RISC vs. CISC consideration and RISC processors were focused on due to their advantages mentioned before.

Microprocessor	Data Bus	Address Bus	Performance in Dhrystone MIPS	Number of Pins	Power (W)
IDT79R3081	32	32	40 @ 50 MHz	84	2.375-4.125
IDT79RC32364	32	32	175 @ 133 MHz	144	0.6-0.9
IDT79R4700	64	64	260 @ 200 MHz	179/208	4.25-7.5
IDT79RC5000	64	64	330 @ 250 MHz	223/272	7.59-8.25
IDT79RC4650	32/64	32/64	175 @ 133 MHz	208	1.646-3.465
IBM PowerPC 401GF	32	32	53 @ 50 MHz	80	0.2
IBM PowerPC 403GCX	32	32	112 @ 80 MHz	160	0.51
IBM PowerPC 405CR	32	32	282 @ 200 MHz	316	0.8
IBM PowerPC 603e	32/64	32/64	135 @ 100 MHz	240/255	3.5-5.8
IBM PowerPC 750CX	32/64	32	1160 @ 500 MHz	256	4.7-11.0
Motorola PowerPC MPC/MPEC603e	32	32	188 @ 133 MHz	240/255	3.5-5.8

Table 3.1. List of Candidate Microprocessors.

### C. CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED MICROPROCESSOR

The microprocessor chosen was IDT79RC4650 RISC Processor manufactured by Integrated Device Technologies (IDT). The RC4650 is a single-chip, COTS RISC architecture with a 32/64-bit multiplexed address/data bus. The determining factor in selecting the RC4650 was its numerous similarities and its compatibility with the R3081 processor that was used in the previous design, as well as its higher performance, its 64-bit multiplexed address/data bus width, which is one of the driving factors of this thesis, and its compact size. One concern is that not all COTS devices are suitable to be used in TMR system. They need to be resistant to destructive radiation effects such as total dose effect, SEL or SEB. However, the radiation environment performance data for the RC4650 was not available at the time of research. Thus, its selection is conditional, subject to the risk of experiencing a destructive fault due to total dose effect, SEL or SEB. However, this is a concept design and a future design based on a processor resistant to destructive effects can use basically the same concept.

The IDT79RC4650 is a low-cost, simplified and power sensitive microprocessor that offers high performance through 64-bit architecture, high-speed pipelines and high-bandwidth caches and bus interface. [Ref. 13] The main features of the RC4650 include:

- 64-bit architecture with 64-bit integer operations, 64-bit registers and 64-bit multiplexed address/data busses.
- High performance microprocessor with DSP capability at 175 Dhrystone MIPS, 66.7M Multiply-Add per second or 44 Mflops at 133 MHz
- High level of integration provides 64-bit integer CPU, single-precision floating-point unit and integer DSP/multiply unit

- Large, on-chip, user configurable, 2-way set associative 8KB data and 8KB instruction caches
- Bus compatible with RC4600 and RC4700 family of processors
- Low power operation at less than 2W at 100 MHz and active power management units
- Low-cost 208-pin package

Figure 3.1 shows a block diagram of the IDT79RC4650 microprocessor. Some of the highlights are:

- System Control Coprocessor (CP0)
  - translates virtual addresses into physical addresses
  - manages exceptions and transitions between kernel and user states
  - controls cache subsystem
  - controls the power management unit.
- Floating Point Coprocessor (CP1)
  - Decodes and executes instructions in parallel with the integer unit
  - Performs single-precision arithmetic
  - Operation set includes floating-point add, subtract, multiply, divide, square root, conversion between fixed-point and floating-point format and compare.
- Integer CPU core
  - 32 general purpose 64-bit registers
  - ALU, shifter, multiply/DSP unit, pipeline controller
- User configurable instruction and data caches
- 32/64 bit synchronized system interface




Figure 3.1. RC4650 Block Diagram from Ref. 13.

### 1. System Control Coprocessor (CP0)

The integrated on-chip System Control Coprocessor manages virtual to physical address translation and the exceptions and transitions between user and kernel states. By sharing common virtual addresses that are mapped to separate physical addresses, the RC4650 supports multiple user tasks in parallel. This facility enables multiple user processes in a single physical memory without the use of a TLB and is implemented via the base-bounds registers in CP0. Kernel mode addresses do not use the base-bounds registers but rather undergo a fixed virtual to physical address translation. CP0 also

controls the cache subsystem as well as providing diagnostic control and error recovery facilities. In addition, it is used to control the power management unit in order to reduce power consumption of the internal core of the CPU. [Ref. 13]

## **2. Floating Point Coprocessor (CP1)**

The RC4650 incorporates an on-chip, single-precision floating-point coprocessor that includes a floating-point register file of 32 32-bit registers and execution units. The floating-point coprocessor forms a seamless interface with the integer unit, decoding and executing instructions in parallel. CP1 performs single-precision arithmetic as specified in IEEE Standard 754. The execution unit is broken into a separate multiply unit and a combined add/convert/divide/square root unit. The floating-point unit's operation set includes floating-point add, subtract, multiply, divide, square root, conversion between fixed-point and floating-point format and floating-point compare. [Ref. 13]

## **3. CPU Core**

The CPU core is a pipelined, 64-bit RISC integer execution unit that includes ALU, shifter, multiply/DSP unit and pipeline controller. It features a load/store architecture with single-cycle ALU operations and an autonomous multiply/divide unit. The register file has 32 64-bit registers, two read ports and one write port. The RC4650 uses a 5-stage pipeline that requires fewer stalls. Once the pipeline is filled, five instructions are executed simultaneously. The simplicity of the pipeline allows the RC4650 to be lower cost and less power-consuming than super-scalar processors. [Ref. 13]



#### **4. Instruction and Data Caches**

The RC4650 incorporates 2-way set-associative, virtually-indexed, physically-tagged, on-chip data and instruction caches default configured to 8kB each. Both the instruction cache and the data cache are organized with line sizes of 32 bytes (8 instructions in the instruction cache) to maximize performance. The default write policy in the data cache is write-back, which means that a store to a cache line doesn't immediately cause memory to be updated. This increases system performance by reducing bus traffic and eliminating the bottleneck of waiting for each store operation to finish before issuing a subsequent memory operation. However, the data cache can be reconfigured to write-through mode. Associated with the data cache is a store buffer that allows the RC4650 to execute a store instruction every processor cycle without penalty. In addition, there is a 4-deep on-chip write buffer, that holds up to 4 data and address pairs and decouples the speed of the processor from the speed of the memory system, minimizing processor stalls due to data write operations. [Ref. 13]

The influence of internal caches on TMR system has not been addressed in this thesis. The TMR concept of error recovery does not include dealing with errors in internal caches. Instead, the internal caches are invalidated by the interrupt handling routine during the context switch operation, which restores the processor register contents to an error-free state.

#### **5. System Interface**

The system interface of the RC4650 consists of a 64-bit multiplexed address and data bus called SysAD, a 9-bit command bus called SysCmd and 6 handshake signals,

namely RdRdy\*, WrRdy\*, ExtRqst\*, Release\*, ValidIn\*, ValidOut\*. Cycles in which SysAD bus contains a valid address are called address cycles and cycles in which SysAD bus contains valid data are called data cycles. Validity of the contents of SysAD and SysCmd busses is indicated by the ValidIn\* and ValidOut\* signals. The command bus specifies the nature of the request, whether a read cycle or a write cycle will take place, and identifies the contents of SysAD bus, either address or data, during any cycle in which it is valid. The RdRdy\* and WrRdy\* signals determine whether a read or a write cycle is beginning. After one of them is sampled, the processor initiates corresponding cycle by putting a valid address on the SysAD bus. The ExtRqst\* and Release\* signals are used to control the transition between master and slave states if there are more than one possible bus masters in a system. [Ref. 13]

A bus interface of a typical RC4650 system contains transparent latches to demultiplex address and data busses. The data path between the memory system and the processor is managed by octal transceivers and a set of PLDs or an FPGA that is used to control the handshake process between the memory system and the processor. A typical RC4650 system is presented in Figure 3.2. [Ref. 13]

This chapter has discussed the issues relevant to the microprocessor selection process and presented a review of the RC4650 microprocessor features. Having selected the microprocessor, the hardware design of the new TMR system using the RC4650 microprocessor will be presented in the following chapter.




Figure 3.2. Typical RC4650 System Architecture from Ref. 13.

## **IV. HARDWARE DESIGN**

The scope of the design described in this thesis does not include the full functionality of the design in Ref. 2 and Ref.3, such as loading and running of user programs. This design rather focuses on the possibility of implementing a TMR system using 64-bit microprocessors and determining a reasonable performance level achievable in the new design, such as maximum clock rate this processor can run at in a TMR design.

Having selected the 64-bit microprocessor, the next step was to identify and implement the changes necessary to accommodate this processor in a TMR design. In some areas, the RC4650 has such compatibility with the R3081 that little or no changes were necessary from the design in Ref. 2 and Ref.3. Examples include memory space and memory decoding unit. This was not the case for other parts of the design where significant changes were necessary, such as the system interface and handshake signals.

### **A. MICROPROCESSOR AND LATCHES**

The key element in the system is the microprocessor. In the case of TMR system, there are actually three microprocessors. Since the address latches are used to demultiplex the address/data busses, they are presented here with the microprocessors. In addition, the SysCmd bits issued by the processors at the beginning of each read/write cycle are latched to make them available for the rest of the read/write cycle and that latch is presented here, too. The schematic diagram of the three microprocessor and the associated latches are given in Figure A.2 in Appendix A.

## **1. Microprocessor**

The microprocessor used in the design in Ref. 2 and Ref.3, the R3081, ran at clock rates of up to 40 MHz with a half-frequency bus. On the other hand, the RC4650 has operation frequencies from 100 MHz up to 267 MHz. This allows a great improvement in performance compared to previous design, thus addressing one of the main advantages of using COTS devices. However, there are some factors that need to be taken into account when selecting the operational clock rate. Although the processors can execute instructions internally at very high speeds, the actual performance is limited by the bus speed. The speed of external busses that connect processors to peripheral units cannot keep up with the internal speeds of modern microprocessors. So, whenever the processor needs to access external resources, the execution of the instruction is limited by the bus speed. Similarly, the semiconductor industry has not improved the speeds of memory chips as much as they improved the speeds of microprocessors. In addition to these, the propagation delay due to the voting logic is the most important factor limiting the execution speed in a TMR system. The voting circuitry inserted between the microprocessor and the memory system adds two more levels of logic, which increases the propagation time of voted signals (address, data and control) between the microprocessor and the memory system. Other signals generated by the programmable devices based on some of the voted signals are also delayed due to voting. Thus, the clock rate the processors will run at was decided after the voting logic was designed and the timing analysis of the system was completed. A slow clock rate would degrade the overall system performance while a high clock rate would introduce excessive number of wait

states and stall the pipelined processors during a memory access. The simulation results presented in Chapter VI showed that a clock rate of 100 MHz would be ideal for the design without excessive number of wait states in each memory access cycle.

## **2. Latches**

In order to reduce the pin count of the RC4650, IDT chose to multiplex the address and data busses into a SysAD bus. This generates a requirement for the designer to split the SysAD bus into data and address busses by using latches. Similarly, the bi-directional SysCmd bus needs to be latched because the command identifier issued during the address cycle on the SysCmd bus contains control bits that are used to generate the memory interface signals. These signals are shown in the programmable device design equations in Appendix B. Normally, demultiplexing is done by using transparent latches that allow the address to appear on the address bus a short propagation delay after the latches are enabled. Since the processor has no pin that indicates the signal on the multiplexed address/data bus is data or address, the latch enable signal has to be generated externally by the designer. The latch enable signal was generated by a NOR gate whose inputs are the most significant bit of SysCmd bus (SysCmd[8]) and ValidOut\* signal. ValidOut\* is an active-low signal that indicates the signal output on SysCmd and SysAD busses by the processor are valid. SysCmd[8], when low, indicates that the current clock cycle is an address cycle, thus the signals on SsyAD bus is an address and the signals on SysCmd bus is a command identifier. The same signal enables both the address latches and the SysCmd latch because the processor drives both address and SysCmd busses simultaneously.

## B. MEMORY SPACE

There are three types of devices in the memory system of the TMR design: Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM), Random Access Memory (RAM) and memory-mapped I/O peripherals. This section will present an overview of the memory space supported by the RC4650 and incorporation of PROM, RAM and I/O peripherals into that memory space.

As mentioned in the section about the microprocessor selection, the memory space supported by the RC4650 is the same as that of the R3081, which minimizes the changes necessary in the memory decoder unit of the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3. As in the case of the R3081, the RC4650 supports a 4 GByte memory space, broken down into four distinct virtual address areas: kernel-user segment (KUSEG), kernel segment 0 (KSEG0), kernel segment 1 (KSEG1) and kernel segment 2 (KSEG2). KUSEG is a cacheable 2 GByte area used for kernel and user processes. KSEG0 is a cacheable 512 MByte space normally used for kernel executable code and kernel data. KSEG1 is a non-cacheable 512 MByte area normally used for memory-mapped I/O, boot ROM code and operating system data. KSEG2 is a cacheable 1 GByte area normally used by operating system for stacks, process data and dynamically allocated memory. A diagram of the virtual memory segments is shown in Figure 4.1 and the corresponding virtual address ranges are given in Table 4.1. [Ref. 13]

Although the RC4650 supports a 4 GByte memory space, the entire space is not usually populated. The size and location of the memory space populated in this design is explained in following sections.




Figure 4.1. Virtual Memory Segments supported by RC4650 from Ref. 13.

Address Bit Values	Status Register Is One Of These Values			Segment Name	Virtual Address Range	Segment Size
	UM	EXL	ERL			
A(31) = 0	UM = 0 or EXL = 1 or ERL = 1			kuseg	0x0000 0000 through 0x7FFF FFFF	2 Gbytes ( $2^{31}$ bytes)
A(31:29) = $100_2$				kseg0	0x8000 0000 through 0x9FFF FFFF	512 Mbytes ( $2^{29}$ bytes)
A(31:29) = $101_2$				kseg1	0xA000 0000 through 0xBFFF FFFF	512 Mbytes ( $2^{29}$ bytes)
A(31:30) = $11_2$				kseg2	0xC000 0000 through 0xFFFF FFFF	1 Gbyte ( $2^{32}$ bytes)

Table 4.1. Address Range of Memory Segments supported by RC4650 from Ref. 13



## **1. PROM**

As explained in Ref. 2, the size and type of PROM is dictated mainly by the operating system. Since this design merely focuses on the incorporation of a 64-bit microprocessor into the previous 32-bit system and the selected processor is both software and memory space compatible with the processor of the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3, it was assumed that the same operating system PROM address space could be implemented in this design. So, the location of the 512 KBytes of PROM within the 4 GByte memory space is the physical address space between 1FC0\_0000 and 1FC7\_FFFF.

One of the two changes in the design was the type of PROM chips being used. Due to increased clock rate of the system, a faster PROM chip would be better in order to avoid excessive number of wait states during accesses to PROM. Another version of the PROM chip that was used in the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3, AMD 27C010-45 which has a data access time of 45 ns and which is available from the same manufacturer (AMD), was selected. The other change necessary was the use of eight of those chips instead of four since data bus width is 64 bits in the current design while it was 32 bits in the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3. The schematic of the PROM memory unit can be found in Figure A.5 in Appendix A.

## **2. SRAM**

The size and location of SRAM memory space is also based on the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3 due to the same reasons expressed in the PROM section, namely software and memory space compatibility of the microprocessors used in the two systems. The factors leading to the selection of SRAM memory size and location was discussed in Ref.

2. In the case of SRAM memory space, the only change necessary was the use of eight instead of four SRAM chips in each of the five 0.5-MByte SRAM blocks due to the expansion of data bus width from 32 bits to 64 bits, bringing the total number of chips to 40 compared to 20 in the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3. The same types of SRAM chips (IDT71024S12) were used because the access time of 12 ns was sufficient for the new system with the increased clock rate.

As discussed in the beginning of the memory section, the RC4650 supports four distinct virtual address segments. From Ref. 2, the design was determined to consist of five 0.5-Mbyte SRAM blocks. These are denoted as KRAM, URAM0, URAM1, URAM2 and URAM3 in the schematic diagram of SRAM memory unit, which can be found in Appendix A. It was also determined that only two of the four virtual address segments would be populated with SRAM which are KUSEG and KSEG0. One of the two SRAM blocks allocated to the operating system (KRAM) was placed in memory segment KSEG0 to provide a random access memory location for the PROM contents to be transferred to and executed from. The remaining operating system SRAM block and the three user SRAM blocks (URAM0-URAM3) were placed in memory segment KUSEG. The schematic diagram of the SRAM memory unit can be found in Figures A.6-A.8 in Appendix A.

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## V. PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC DESIGN

Several key functions in the TMR design are performed by programmable logic, including programmable logic devices (PLD) and field programmable gate arrays (FPGA). Most of the design changes required to accommodate a 64-bit microprocessor in TMR system were made in this part of the system. The first step in the transformation from the previous 32-bit design to the current 64-bit design was to understand the functions performed by the programmable logic in the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3 and reconfigure the programmable devices to perform the same functions in the new design. Although the RC4650 was selected due to its similarities and compatibility with the R3081 of the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3, it had a completely different system interface which required considerable change in the design of programmable logic devices that generate the memory interface signals.

The functions performed by the PLDs and the FPGAs were clearly defined and distinct in the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3, which facilitated understanding how the system worked. The two PLDs were designed to perform memory control and memory enable functions while the FPGAs were designed to perform voting, address decoding and system controller functions. The first approach was to follow the same technique by dividing the functions among each device in the same way. The initial design showed that the differences in the system interfaces of the two microprocessors, especially the complexity of the RC4650 system interface compared to that of R3081, required the use of twice as many PLDs as was used in the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3 if the functions performed by PLDs and FPGAs were to be divided in the same distinctive way. However,

the restrictions imposed by the space and power limitations of a space application dictated the use of as few devices as possible to perform the same functions.

The second approach was to include the functions performed by PLDs into an FPGA to reduce the number of devices being used, thus covering less space and consuming less power. But this approach was not feasible due to the longer propagation delay of the FPGAs being used compared to that of the PLDs. Some memory control signals had to be generated in a shorter time than could be achieved by the FPGA, otherwise the read/write cycle would be stalled with a prohibitively excessive number of wait states. The propagation delay of the FPGA would allow the system to achieve only twice the performance level of the R3081 TMR system, which means a system clock rate of 20 MHz vice 10 MHz clock rate of the R3081 TMR design. This was not a satisfactory performance improvement compared to what was expected from this system designed using a 64-bit modern microprocessor capable of running at clock rates of up to 267 MHz.

The final design of the programmable logic incorporated two functions. First one is generating some critical memory control/enable signals, which might have an adverse effect on system interface timing, by using PLDs. This allows minimizing the number of PLDs to be used. Second one is generating other memory control/enable signals, which did not cause additional wait states, by using FPGAs. This approach led to a design using two PLDs and two FPGAs, which is considered to be the optimum design that accommodates the 64-bit microprocessors.

## **A. FPGA DESIGN**

The system in Ref. 2 used three FPGAs to perform voter, address decoder, timer and system control functions. Since the scope of this thesis includes the feasibility analysis of implementing the TMR fault tolerance concept using 64-bit microprocessors and a performance evaluation rather than a complete TMR system design using 64-bit microprocessors, this design focused on the core function in the TMR concept of voting and error detection. For this reason, the system controller functionality was not implemented in the FPGA design. The FPGAs in this design were used to perform the functions of voting, address decoding and some of the memory control/enable functions due to the design considerations explained in the previous section. This section presents the FPGA selection process and the design of the two FPGAs used in the system. Schematics of the FPGA designs are presented in Appendix C.

### **1. FPGA Selection**

The initial approach in FPGA selection was using the same XILINX XC4013XLA-PQ240 FPGAs from the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3 due to their advantages explained in Ref. 2 and to facilitate continuity. The first consideration in the selection process was the number of pins required for the function of each FPGA. Since RC4650 microprocessor issued 32-bit addresses although it has a 64-bit multiplexed address/data bus, the address voting/decoding and the added functionality of voting the 9-bit system command bus and generating some memory control/enable signals could be accommodated in a XC4013XLA-PQ240 FPGA which offered 192 I/O pins. However, voting the 64-bit data busses from the three processors to produce a 64-bit voted data bus

output requires at least 256 I/O pins, more than the total number of I/O pins available on a XC4013XLA-PQ240 FPGA.

The second consideration was the requirement of the TMR concept to use radiation hardened FPGAs since the FPGAs are a single point of failure in the TMR concept. There were three members of the XC4000XLA family that had a radiation-hardened version available at the time of the design. Only one of those three, the XC4062XLA-BG432 package with 352 I/O pins, had enough number of I/O pins to accommodate the data voting function; and that chip was selected to be used as the data voter FPGA. [Ref. 14]

## **2. Address/Control Voter, Memory Decoder FPGA**

The functions implemented in this FPGA are the majority voting of the three 30-bit address and 9-bit system command busses, the decoding of the upper thirteen bits of the voted address lines to generate chip select signals, and the generation of some of the memory control/memory enable signals. The logic design of these functions is presented in this section.

### ***a) Address/Control Voter***


Since the RC4650 multiplexes its address and data pins, latches are used to separate the address and data busses. In this design, the system address/data busses, SysAD, of the microprocessors are split into two different paths, one registered and the other not. The registered path is the address path and the unregistered path is the data path. When the RC4650 initiates a bus cycle, the SysAD bus is driven with the address to be accessed and the ValidOut\* signal is asserted which was used to generate the latch

enable signal. Then, the transparent latches drive the address bus with the latched address to be accessed. The address is held on the address bus by the latch until the following bus cycle when latches are enabled to latch a new address. The three address busses driven similarly must be majority voted before being passed to the memory system.

The voting is done using macros, which are building blocks used to create a hierarchical design in Xilinx Foundation Series Design Suite. Voting the address is achieved by using the Majority Voter/Error Detector macros called VOTER4. Each VOTER4 macro consists of four of the voter/error detector sub-macro presented in Figure 5.1 and votes three 4-bit inputs and generates a 4-bit majority-voted output and a 4-bit error output that shows which bit in the 4-bit inputs had a mismatch. Since the number of address lines voted is 30, eight of the VOTER4 macros were used for address voting.

Similarly, voting the 9-bit command identifiers from the three microprocessors is achieved by using the Majority Voter/Error Detector macro called VOTER9. The VOTER9 macro consists of nine of the voter/error detector sub-macros presented in Figure 5.1 and one VOTER9 macro is sufficient for control voting. For more information about the design and function of the sub-macro in Figure 5.1, see Ref. 2.





Similarly, the control voter takes three 9-bit command identifier busses and a Force input to generate a 9-bit voted command identifier named VOTCTRL and a 9-bit error bus. This is implemented by using a single 9-bit wide voter/error detector

module (VOTER9), which was mentioned above. The 9-bit error bus is reduced to a single control vote error output, CVOTERR. This was implemented in the same way as address vote error signal (AVOTERR) was generated as explained above.

Although not a part of the command identifier word, the ValidOut\* signal from the microprocessor is another control signal in the system interface that indicates the validity of the signals on the address/data bus SysAD and system command bus SysCmd. The ValidOut\* signals from the three microprocessors are voted in the Address/Control Voter FPGA and a voted ValidOut\* signal, VotValidOut\*, is output which is used to generate some of the memory control/enable signals.

*b) Memory Decoder*

Memory decoder takes the upper thirteen bits of the voted address bus and decodes them into chip select signals. A chip select signal is generated for each of the five SRAM memory blocks, the EPROM, the UART, the Timer and the Interrupt Acknowledge. Table 5.1 shows the chip select name, its physical address, its virtual address and the memory segment it belongs to. The addresses correspond to the upper thirteen bits of the voted address bus with zeros concatenated to the end. The table shows that the Kernel SRAM resides in KSEG0, the remainder of the SRAM resides in the KUSEG, and all of the peripherals and the EPROM reside in the non-cached KSEG1 as discussed in Chapter IV. The Memory Decoder schematic is presented in Figure C.1 in Appendix C.

Signal Name	Peripheral	Physical Address	Virtual Address	Memory Segment
KRAMCS*	SRAM	0x0000	0x8000	KSEG0
URAM0CS*	SRAM	0x4000	0x0000	KUSEG
URAM1CS*	SRAM	0x4008	0x0008	KUSEG
URAM2CS*	SRAM	0x4010	0x0010	KUSEG
URAM3CS*	SRAM	0x4018	0x0018	KUSEG
TIMERCS*	TIMER	0x0440	0xA440	KSEG1
INTCS*	INTERRUPT	0x1000	0xB000	KSEG1
EPROMCS*	EPROM	0x1FC0	0xBFC0	KSEG1
UARTCS*	UART	0x1FE0	0xBFE0	KSEG1

Table 5.1. Chip Select Memory Map from Ref 2.

*c) Memory Control/Memory Enable Signals*

Due to the reasons and design considerations mentioned at the beginning of this section, read enable (RDEN\*), read (RD), write (WR) and write data enable (WRDATAEN) signals were generated using the Address/Control Voter FPGA where all the signals required to generate these signals were available. The equations that represent the design of the logic to generate those signals are presented in Appendix B.

The RDEN\* signal works in concert with the chip select signals to activate the output drivers of memory devices. Since all the logic between the processors and the chip select signals is combinatorial, there is the possibility that the wrong chip select signal may glitch while the voted address bus is settling, which may cause a wrong memory address to be accessed. This is avoided by activating the outputs of the memory devices with the RDEN\* signal which is asserted later in the cycle after the chip select signals stabilize and thus, gives memory device time to access the memory location and move the data to its outputs. Unlike the write enable signals presented in the section on

PLD design, only one RDEN\* signal is required since reads are done in complete words. RDEN\* signal is passed to all of the devices in the memory block in parallel.

The RDEN\* signal is generated using the RESET\*, CYCEND\* signals and the three bits from the voted command identifier that indicate the nature of the bus cycle, VOTCTRL[7:5]. It is asserted when those three command identifier bits are 000 indicating a read request, unless RESET\* or CYCEND\* is asserted. It is de-asserted by CYCEND\* being asserted. This turns the output drivers of the memory device off at the end of a bus cycle as soon as possible and reduces the possibility of bus contention.

RD signal was designed to decode the read request, represented in the command identifier with the three bits VOTCTRL[7:5] being 000, into an active-high RD signal in order to reduce the number of pins and thus, the complexity in the memory enable/memory control logic.

Similarly, WR signal was designed to decode the write request, represented in the command identifier with the three bits VOTCTRL[7:5] being 010, into an active-high WR signal.

During a write cycle, the data from all three microprocessors are voted and the voted data signals drive the voted-data-bus output of the Data Voter FPGA. Since not all 64 voted data signals are generated at the same time due to different delays in each of their individual paths, those signals will be bouncing for a short time before they settle. To avoid those 64 data lines bouncing and generating noise, which may cause other problems in the system, the voted data output of the Data Voter FPGA needs to be enabled after a time when all signals in the voted data bus have settled. Hence,

WRDATAEN signal was designed to enable and control the direction of data flow on the bi-directional data path in the Data Voter FPGA. It is generated by using the CYCEND\*, RESET\* signals and the VOTCTRL[8:5] bits of the voted command identifier. It is asserted when the current transaction is a write request indicated by VOTCTRL[7:5] being 010 and there is valid data on the data bus indicated by VOTCTRL[8] being 1. It is de-asserted by CYCEND\* being asserted at the end of the bus cycle or RESET\* being asserted.

During a read cycle, data from memory is passed to the Data Voter FPGA and, passing through the bi-directional data path in the Data Voter FPGA without being voted, distributed to the address/data busses of all three microprocessors. Similarly, the direction of data flow during a read cycle is controlled by another data enable signal called Read Data Enable RDDATAEN\*. However, it was not necessary to generate a new signal because the timing of the RDEN\* signal, which was designed to enable the output drivers of the memory devices, made it suitable to be used as RDDATAEN\* signal, too. Although there is no signal named RDDATAEN\*, its function is carried out by the RDEN\* signal.

### **3. Data Voter/Transceiver FPGA**

The only function implemented in the Data Voter FPGA is the majority voting of the three 64-bit data busses and controlling the direction of data flow. Its design is very similar to the Address Voter FPGA but it uses a different macro to perform the voting function and it is bi-directional. A new voter/error detector macro named VOTER16 was designed in the same manner as VOTER4 macro of the Address Voter FPGA. However,

it consists of 16 of the sub-macro that was presented in Figure 5.1 instead of four. They are connected in parallel and this gives a 16-bit wide voted output path. Thus, the number of macros needed for a 64-bit data path is reduced to four. The four 16-bit error busses, one from each macro, are combined in the same manner as the error busses in the Address Voter to a single data vote error output named DVOTERR.

The Data Voter/Transceiver FPGA had to be designed for bi-directional data flow because the information passing across the data bus flows in both directions: from microprocessors to memory devices and from memory devices to microprocessors. The data on the address/data busses of the three microprocessors need to be combined through the voting logic and sent to the memory devices during write cycles. During read cycles, the data on the single data bus coming from the memory devices needs to bypass the voting logic and be split into three copies that drive the address/data busses of the three microprocessors. This functionality was achieved using tri-state buffers enabled by the RDDATAEN\* and WRDATAEN signals to control the direction of data flow. The design of this logic was done in Ref. 2 and the concept is presented in Figure 5.2 for one of the 64 bits of the data bus. The transceiver design of Ref. 2 was expanded from a 32-bit data path to a 64-bit data path to be used in this design.




Figure 5.2. One-bit Slice of the Transceiver Logic Design from Ref. 2.

During a write cycle, all three input pins are driven by the microprocessors. The WRDATAEN signal enables BUFE tri-state buffers on each side of the voter logic. The data flows through input tri-state buffers, the voter logic and the output tri-state buffers. The voted data also returns towards input pins but it is blocked by the BUFT tri-state buffers disabled by the RDATAEN\* signal.

During a read cycle, the input pin on the right side is driven by the memory devices. The signal is routed through the input buffer and the three BUFT tri-state buffers enabled by RDATAEN\* signal, to the output pins on the microprocessor side. The WRDATAEN signal prevents data from flowing back into the voting logic by disabling BUFE tri-state buffers.

## **B. PLD DESIGN**

A different version of the ATF22V10C PLDs, which were also used in the design in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3, was used in this design to facilitate continuity. It has a maximum delay of 5 ns. The system design presented in Ref. 2 and Ref. 3 used two PLDs to perform Memory Enable and Memory Controller functions. As stated in the previous section, in this design, those functions are implemented in both PLDs and FPGAs due to the timing requirements and the limited number of input/output pins available in the PLDs. In addition, the memory enable and memory control functions are not divided among different PLDs but performed mutually because one PLD would not be enough for the memory enable function which requires 12 output pins while 22V10 PLD has only 10. Thus, there is no distinction among the PLDs as memory control PLD and memory enable PLD as was the case in previous design. Instead, they are called as PLD1 and PLD2.

The schematics showing how the PLDs are interconnected within the TMR system are provided in Appendix A and the design equations used to program the PLDs are provided in Appendix B. The next two subsections describe the functions of the PLDs.

### **1. PLD1**

When the microprocessors generate the signals initiating a bus transaction, the address, data and control signals are voted, memory control signals are generated by the FPGAs based on those voted signals and the necessary signals are passed on to the PLDs. PLD1 uses lowest three bits of the voted command identifier (VOTCTRL[2:0]), read signal (RD), write signal (WR), RESET\*, system clock (SYSCLK), and the cycle end



signal (CYCEND\*) to generate the memory control signals ValidIn\*, CYCEND\* and the memory enable signals WRENA\*, WRENB\*, WRENC\*, WREND\*. This section describes the signals generated by PLD1.

*a) Counter*

Both PLD1 and PLD2 use an internal 4-bit counter to count the clock cycles and to provide timing reference for different bus cycles. This allows the microprocessor to interact with devices of various speeds by introducing wait states into the bus cycle for devices that cannot respond in a single access time.

The counter is implemented in each PLD by using four of the ten I/O pins. It uses the RESET\*, CYCEND\*, SYSCLK, RD and WR inputs to determine when to count and when to reset back to zero. RESET\* signal is used to reset the counter whenever a system reset is required. CYCEND\* signal is used to identify the end of the current bus cycle and reset the counter back to zero. RD and WR signals are generated by the Address/Control Voter FPGA using voted command identifier signals. Unless RESET\* or CYCEND\* is asserted, the counter increments on each rising edge of SYSCLK after RD or WR signal has been asserted.

*b) Cycle End (CYCEND\*)*

The CYCEND\* signal is an active-low signal used to indicate the end of the current bus cycle. It is generated from RESET\*, RD, WR, EPROMCS\* inputs and the counter contents. The timing of the CYCEND\* signal is dependent on the latency required to access the device and the type of bus cycle that is being run. RD and WR signals are used to determine the type of bus cycle. The active-low EPROMCS\* signal

and the counter contents are used to determine device latency. All the memory system, except EPROM for which only read cycle is applicable, can perform a read in 7 clock cycles or a write in 6 clock cycles. EPROM requires three additional wait states and completes a read in 10 clock cycles.

*c) ValidIn\**

The ValidIn\* is an active-low signal generated by memory control unit and indicates to the microprocessors that memory is accessed and data placed on the address/data bus is valid. The ValidIn\* signal is generated using EPROMCS\*, RD, RESET\* signals and the counter contents. Since address/data bus is driven by memory only during a read cycle, this signal is only asserted on read transactions. All the memory system, except EPROM, can perform a read in 7 clock cycles and ValidIn\* is asserted at the end of the read transaction when counter content is 7. Since access to EPROM requires three additional clock cycles, ValidIn\* is asserted when counter content is 10 during EPROM read cycle. Since the counter content changes every clock cycle, this signal is asserted only for one clock cycle and then de-asserted.

*d) Write Enable Signals*

Since RC4650 supports byte, two-byte, three-byte, halfword, four-byte, five-byte, six-byte, seven-byte and fullword writes, Write Enable strobes are used to determine which bytes of the word are going to be involved in the transaction. The eight write enable signals are WRENA\*, WRENB\*, WRENC\*, WREND\*, WRENE\*, WRENF\*, WRENG\* and WRENH\*. WRENH\* corresponds to the most significant byte and WRENA\* corresponds to the least significant byte. Since one PLD was not able to

generate all the eight write enable strobes as well as a 4-bit counter, the task was divided between the two PLDs. However, it is more suitable to present all of the strobes in this section because both PLD1 and PLD2 use the same inputs to generate these signals.

Write Enable strobes are generated using the least significant three bits of the voted command identifier VOTCTRL[2:0], WR, RESET\* signals and the counter contents. RESET\* signal de-asserts write enable strobes when system is reset. When WR signal is asserted, the corresponding write enable strobes will be asserted based on the coding in the least significant three bits of the command identifier. The truth table for this function is given in Table 5.2. For the negative logic signals indicated by an asterisk, 0 signifies an asserted signal.

WR	VOTCTRL[2:0]	WRH*	WRG*	WRF*	WRE*	WRD*	WRC*	WRB*	WRA*
1	000	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
1	001	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
1	010	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
1	011	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	100	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
1	101	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 5.2. Byte Write Enable Strobes Assertion Table.

## 2. PLD2

When the microprocessors generate the signals initiating a bus transaction, the address, data and control signals are voted, memory control signals are generated by the FPGAs based on those voted signals and the necessary signals are passed on to the PLDs. PLD2 uses lowest three bits of the voted command identifier VOTCTRL[2:0], read signal (RD), write signal (WR), RESET\*, system clock (SYSCLK), voted ValidOut\* signal (VotValidOut\*), and the cycle end signal (CYCEND\*) to generate the system interface signals WrRdy\*, RdRdy\* and the memory enable signals WRENE\*, WRENF\*, WRENG\*, WRENH\*. This section describes the signals generated by PLD2 other than the write enable strobes and the 4-bit internal counter, which were mentioned in the section about PLD1.

### a) *Read Ready (RdRdy\*)*

RdRdy\* is an active-low signal used to indicate to the microprocessor that memory system is ready for a read transaction. After the microprocessor senses that RdRdy\* is asserted, it initiates the read cycle by driving the address/data bus with a valid address and the system command bus with a valid command identifier that indicates the nature of the transaction and by asserting the ValidOut\* signal that indicates the signals on those two busses are valid. PLD2 uses CYCEND\*, voted ValidOut\* and the current RdRdy\* signals to generate the RdRdy\* signal. RdRdy\* is de-asserted when voted ValidOut\* signal is asserted meaning that processor has initiated a bus transaction. RdRdy\* stays asserted as long as voted ValidOut\* is de-asserted meaning that the processor hasn't initiated a bus transaction.

*b) Write Ready (WrRdy\*)*

WrRdy\* is an active-low signal used to indicate to the processor that memory system is ready for a write transaction. After the processor senses that WrRdy\* is asserted, it initiates the transaction by driving the address/data bus with a valid address and the system command bus with a command identifier that indicates the nature of the transaction and asserting the ValidOut\* signal that indicates the signals on those two busses are valid. PLD2 uses CYCEND\*, voted ValidOut\* and the current RdRdy\* signals to generate the WrRdy\* signal. WrRdy\* is de-asserted when voted ValidOut\* signal is asserted meaning that processor has initiated a bus transaction. WrRdy\* stays asserted as long as voted ValidOut\* is de-asserted meaning that the processor hasn't initiated a bus transaction.

This chapter has presented the design of the programmable devices used in the implementation of the TMR system. Having completed the hardware design associated with this thesis, the results of the simulation of the system and the detailed system timing analysis are presented in the next chapter.

## **VI. SYSTEM TIMING ANALYSIS**

After the hardware and the programmable devices were designed, system simulation and timing analysis was conducted. The purpose of the timing analysis is to determine if the system operates as expected and to ensure that no bus contention occurs. The system is designed to operate with a clock rate of 100 MHz, which means a clock cycle of 10 ns.

The timing analysis was conducted on the two basic types of bus transaction: Read Cycles and Write Cycles. The following sections present the results of the timing analysis.

### **A. READ CYCLES**

During a read cycle, the processor initiates the bus cycle after it is informed that memory system is ready, memory system responds to the request and the bus cycle is terminated. When the timing analysis was conducted, it was found that SRAM and EPROM have different timing diagrams due to the difference in memory access times of the devices. The read cycle timing diagram for SRAM memory is presented in Figure 6.2.

Once the processors sense the RdRdy\* signal which remains asserted until a new bus transaction is initiated, they initiate the read bus cycle by driving the SysAD bus with the address, the SysCmd bus with the command identifier and by asserting the ValidOut\* signal which indicates that valid address and command identifier are driven on the corresponding busses. The address and the command identifier are latched after ValidOut\* signal is asserted and they continue to the Address/Control Voter FPGA. In the next clock cycle, latches are blocked by the negation of ValidOut\* signal and do not

pass the input to the output anymore. SysAD/SysCmd busses are not driven (they are in high impedance state) and are available to receive data supplied by the memory devices.




Figure 6.1. TMR RC4650 Top Level Schematic




Figure 6.2. Read Timing Diagram

After the address and the command identifier have been latched, the Address/Control Voter FPGA receives, votes and decodes. Voted address and command identifier, as well as CS\*, RDEN\*, RD signals required by the memory system, are generated and output by the Address/Control Voter FPGA. Voted address, CS\* and RDEN\* signals are used to drive memory devices. Once RDEN\* and CS\* signals are asserted, the specified memory devices access the appropriate memory location and output the requested data on the SysAD bus. If the memory section being accessed is in the EPROM block, the memory access time requires insertion of three additional wait state clock cycles compared to SRAM read cycle. With the rising edge of the clock cycle after the wait states, two signals that terminate the bus cycle are asserted: the ValidIn\*



signal, which indicates to the processors that data on SysAD busses from memory is valid, and the CYCEND\* signal, which indicates the end of cycle and de-asserts RDEN\* and CS\* signals. After sensing ValidIn\* signal, processors read the data on their SysAD busses and the read cycle is terminated.

## B. WRITE CYCLES

During a write cycle, the processor initiates the bus cycle and issues data to be written, memory system responds to the request and the bus cycle is terminated. Since EPROM is a read-only device, write cycle timing analysis was conducted based on only SRAM device parameters. The write cycle timing diagram is presented in Figure 6.3.




Figure 6.3. Write Timing Diagram

Once the processors sense the  $WrRdy^*$  signal which remains asserted unless a new bus transaction is initiated, they initiate the write bus cycle by driving the SysAD bus with the address, the SysCmd bus with the command identifier and by asserting the ValidOut\* signal which indicates that valid address and command identifier are driven on the corresponding busses. The address and the command identifier are latched after ValidOut\* signal is asserted and they continue to the Address/Control Voter FPGA. In the next clock cycle, latches are blocked by the negation of ValidOut\* signal and do not pass the input signals from the SysAD bus to the output anymore. At this time, SysAD busses are driven by the processors with data to be written to the memory.

After the address and the command identifier have been latched, the Address/Control Voter FPGA where they are voted and decoded receives them. Voted address and command identifier, as well as  $CS^*$ , WRDATAEN, WR signals required by the memory system, are generated and output by the Address/Control Voter FPGA. In addition, data on SysAD bus is received and voted by Data Voter FPGA. Voted data is output by Data Voter FPGA when output drivers are enabled by the WRDATAEN signal. Finally, Write Enable signals that enable the memory devices are generated by PLDs at the end of the cycle when voted data is available at the data inputs of memory devices. Voted address, voted data,  $CS^*$  and write enable signals drive the memory devices.

Two signals are asserted at the end of the write cycle: write enable signals and CYCEND\* signal. Once the write enable signals are asserted, the specified memory devices write data on the SysAD bus to the appropriate memory location. Simultaneously,

CYCEND\* signal, which indicates the end of bus cycle and de-asserts WRDATAEN and CS\* signals, is asserted and the write cycle terminates.

### C. TIMING ANALYSIS

The timing diagrams are based on the data provided by the datasheets of the components being used. The latches have a typical latch enable to output delay of 4.7-5.6 ns which is approximated to 5 ns in timing diagrams. The PLDs have a delay of 5 ns which applies to signals generated thereby. The delay of FPGAs depend on the specific function. The voting function takes between 5-7 ns, address decoding (CS\*) and memory enable (RDEN\*, WRDATAEN) functions take 15 and 20 ns, respectively.

For the read cycle, the time between when the memory is enabled and when data is available is 6 ns for SRAM which is approximated to 10 ns and 45 ns for PROM. The difference causes 3 additional wait states during PROM memory access. For the write cycle, the time when data is valid and the memory is write-enabled is 7 ns which is the setup time. No hold time is necessary.

Looking at the timing diagrams in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 and considering the allocation of timing to the components, it is concluded that the system works as described without contention. However, the effect of voting on the bus speed is clearly seen. A typical single-processor RC4650 system without TMR completes a read cycle in 5 clock cycles and a write cycle in 4 clock cycles. [Ref. 13] On the other hand, the RC4650 TMR system completes a read cycle in 7 clock cycles and a write cycle in 6 clock cycles. The bus speed is reduced by approximately %50 due to voting and other delays of TMR

implementation. This performance is considered acceptable when the speed advantage of COTS microprocessors is taken into account.

This chapter presented the timing analysis conducted using the method of adding up delays of each functional unit cascaded in the system to determine the overall system performance. The following chapter concludes this thesis and discusses possible areas for follow on research.

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## **VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH**

The previous chapters have provided background information about the TMR concept and presented the work done in this project. This chapter will present the conclusions drawn from this project and the areas to be worked on for follow-on research.

### **A. CONCLUSIONS**

Due to rapidly shrinking radiation hardened device market and increasing cost of such devices, the use of COTS devices, which offer state-of-the-art technology, in radiation environment has been gaining support increasingly. However, the susceptibility of COTS devices to SEUs requires the implementation of a protection mechanism, one example of which is the TMR concept used in this project.

The TMR system implemented in this thesis incorporates 64-bit microprocessors with the intent of increasing the system performance compared to the previously designed 32-bit TMR system of Ref. 2 and Ref. 3 while maintaining the same functionality. Thus, by the use of COTS devices in space applications, state-of-the-art technology is introduced. However, the scope of this thesis was limited to a system designed to verify the possibility of implementing a 64-bit TMR design and to observe the performance improvement rather than presenting a fully functional fault-tolerant computing unit. So, it does not include all the functionality of the previous design although it was based on this previous work.

The system consists of processors, memory system and the programmable glue logic in between. The processor was selected based on the criteria presented in Chapter III. The memory system includes ROM and RAM units. The programmable logic where

most of the design work was focused contains the address decoder, voter and memory control/enable units. The use of 64-bit processors introduced the difficulty of dealing with increased number of pins and required the use of programmable devices with more I/O pins to accommodate the functions to be executed on those 64-bit busses. After schematic designs were drawn and the programmable devices were designed, the timing analysis of the system was conducted to determine that there were no bus contentions and that the system functioned as expected.

The implementation in this research and the work of previous researchers on this topic prove that the TMR concept is a valid method of protecting against the effects of SEUs on COTS devices. In addition, this thesis supports the claim that the higher performance COTS processors can be incorporated into a TMR system to realize the objective of increasing the system performance while maintaining fault tolerance. The performance figures in Chapter VI verify this conclusion.

The fact that the performance penalty of TMR implementation is applicable only during external memory access cycles and not during the internal operation of the processors, suggests that the performance penalty of TMR implementation can be tolerated in return for the benefit of fault tolerance gained from the implementation.

## **B. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH**

Since the scope of the projects as large as this one is too wide to be completed during the research period of one student, the project needs to be completed by other students as a result of their follow-on research. The possible areas of follow-on research are explained in this section.

## **1. Completion of TMR Hardware Implementation**

This thesis presented a partial design of a TMR RC4650 system. The current design includes only the core of a TMR system that consists of the RC4650 microprocessors, the memory system and the programmable logic that performs the system interface function between the processors and the memory system. This configuration allows verifying the possibility of implementing a TMR system using 64-bit microprocessors and evaluating its performance.

In order to provide the full functionality of the system, the design has to be completed to make it ready to be manufactured on a board. The design and implementation of a System Controller FPGA, which controls data transfer to the operating system during an interrupt for analysis, and the associated FIFO array are the most important features to complete the TMR system. Besides the functional units of the TMR concept, the support elements are also essential to make the actual hardware work. They need to be completed before the design can be converted to an actual board. The support elements include the I/O interface to communicate with peripheral units and to load programs, the clock circuit, the reset circuit, the interrupt logic and the power/ground connections.

## **2. Hardware-Software Integration**

Once the hardware design is complete and the board is manufactured and fully tested, the software necessary to control and operate the system needs to be integrated. This includes an operating system and a software interface module that is in charge of the interrupt handling and error recovery process. The software integration section of this



project will have similarities with the previous software integration work on the TMR R3081 design, which was presented in Ref. 4. Thus, this follow-on research may begin by following the steps taken in the thesis work mentioned above.

### **3. Radiation Testing**

After the hardware and software integration and testing is completed, the system will be ready for radiation testing. Since the system is designed to detect and correct radiation induced SEUs, it must be tested in a radiation environment before it can be declared operational. Radiation testing can be conducted at the test facilities in University of California, Berkeley and University of California, Davis. The influence of SEUs on the system can be analyzed by using the data captured by the software interface module that will be developed during software integration.

In addition, the system can be used to compare TMR hardware fault tolerance technique with software fault tolerance techniques. This requires conducting tests in TMR mode and single processor mode since the system can operate in either of those modes.

## APPENDIX A. TMR DESIGN SCHEMATICS

This appendix presents the schematics for the TMR RC4650 System. Table A.1 lists the schematics and the pages they appear on.

Figure Number and Description	Page Number
Figure A.1. TMR RC4650 Top Level Schematic	76
Figure A.2. One of the three microprocessors and the associated latches	77
Figure A.3. Address/Control Voter FPGA with PLD1 and PLD2	78
Figure A.4. Data Voter FPGA	79
Figure A.5. PROM Memory Block	80
Figure A.6 KRAM and SRAM0 Segments of SRAM Memory Block	81
Figure A.7 SRAM1 and SRAM2 Segments of SRAM Memory Block	82
Figure A.8 SRAM3 Segment of SRAM Memory Block	83




Figure A.1. TMR RC4650 Top Level Schematic




Figure A.2. One of the three microprocessors and the associated latches




Figure A.3. Address/Control Voter FPGA with PLD1 and PLD2

Pin No	Signal	Pin No	Signal	Pin No	Signal	Pin No	Signal	Pin No	Signal
AJ2	FORCE	V28	DATAA48	AF2	DATAB37	AK20	DATAAC26	U31	VOIDATA15
AK3	WRDATAEN	P28	DATAA49	AD2	DATAB38	AK19	DATAAC27	W31	VOIDATA16
AK4	RDENN	J28	DATAA50	AB2	DATAB39	AK17	DATAAC28	Y31	VOIDATA17
AJ7	DVOTERR	G28	DATAA51	Y2	DATAB40	AK15	DATAAC29	AB31	VOIDATA18
J3	SYNC	D29	DATAA52	W2	DATAB41	AK13	DATAAC30	AD31	VOIDATA19
A17	DATAA0	B25	DATAA53	U2	DATAB42	AK12	DATAAC31	AF31	VOIDATA20
A19	DATAA1	B23	DATAA54	R2	DATAB43	AK10	DATAAC32	AG31	VOIDATA21
A20	DATAA2	B18	DATAA55	N2	DATAB44	AK8	DATAAC33	AL27	VOIDATA22
A22	DATAA3	A15	DATAA56	M2	DATAB45	AK6	DATAAC34	AL26	VOIDATA23
A24	DATAA4	A13	DATAA57	K2	DATAB46	AK5	DATAAC35	AL24	VOIDATA24
A26	DATAA5	A12	DATAA58	H2	DATAB47	AG3	DATAAC36	AL22	VOIDATA25
A27	DATAA6	A10	DATAA59	V29	DATAB48	AF3	DATAAC37	AL20	VOIDATA26
A28	DATAA7	A6	DATAA60	P29	DATAB49	AD3	DATAAC38	AL19	VOIDATA27
E28	DATAA8	A5	DATAA61	J29	DATAB50	AB3	DATAAC39	AL17	VOIDATA28
F28	DATAA9	E1	DATAA62	G29	DATAB51	Y3	DATAAC40	AL15	VOIDATA29
H28	DATAA10	F1	DATAA63	C30	DATAB52	W3	DATAAC41	AL13	VOIDATA30
K28	DATAA11	B17	DATAB0	C25	DATAB53	U3	DATAAC42	AL12	VOIDATA31
M28	DATAA12	B19	DATAB1	C23	DATAB54	R3	DATAAC43	AL10	VOIDATA32
N28	DATAA13	B20	DATAB2	C18	DATAB55	N3	DATAAC44	AL8	VOIDATA33
R28	DATAA14	B22	DATAB3	B15	DATAB56	M3	DATAAC45	AL6	VOIDATA34
U28	DATAA15	B24	DATAB4	B13	DATAB57	K3	DATAAC46	AL5	VOIDATA35
W28	DATAA16	B26	DATAB5	B12	DATAB58	H3	DATAAC47	AG4	VOIDATA36
Y28	DATAA17	B27	DATAB6	B10	DATAB59	V30	DATAAC48	AF4	VOIDATA37
AB28	DATAA18	B28	DATAB7	B6	DATAB60	P30	DATAAC49	AD4	VOIDATA38
AD28	DATAA19	E29	DATAB8	B5	DATAB61	J30	DATAAC50	AB4	VOIDATA39
AF28	DATAA20	F29	DATAB9	E2	DATAB62	G30	DATAAC51	Y4	VOIDATA40
AG28	DATAA21	H29	DATAB10	F2	DATAB63	D30	DATAAC52	W4	VOIDATA41
AH27	DATAA22	K29	DATAB11	C17	DATAB64	D25	DATAAC53	U4	VOIDATA42
AH26	DATAA23	M29	DATAB12	C19	DATAB65	D23	DATAAC54	R4	VOIDATA43
AH24	DATAA24	N29	DATAB13	C20	DATAB66	D18	DATAAC55	N4	VOIDATA44
AH22	DATAA25	R29	DATAB14	C22	DATAB67	C15	DATAAC56	M4	VOIDATA45
AH20	DATAA26	U29	DATAB15	C24	DATAB68	C13	DATAAC57	K4	VOIDATA46
AH19	DATAA27	W29	DATAB16	C26	DATAB69	C12	DATAAC58	H4	VOIDATA47
AH17	DATAA28	Y29	DATAB17	C27	DATAB70	C10	DATAAC59	T30	VOIDATA48
AH15	DATAA29	AB29	DATAB18	C28	DATAB71	C6	DATAAC60	T31	VOIDATA49
AH13	DATAA30	AD29	DATAB19	E30	DATAB72	C5	DATAAC61	L30	VOIDATA50
AH12	DATAA31	AF29	DATAB20	F30	DATAB73	E3	DATAAC62	L29	VOIDATA51
AH10	DATAA32	AG29	DATAB21	H30	DATAB74	F3	DATAAC63	D31	VOIDATA52
AH8	DATAA33	AJ27	DATAB22	K30	DATAB75	D17	VOIDATA0	B29	VOIDATA53
AH6	DATAA34	AJ26	DATAB23	M30	DATAB76	D19	VOIDATA1	C21	VOIDATA54
AH5	DATAA35	AJ24	DATAB24	N30	DATAB77	D20	VOIDATA2	B21	VOIDATA55
AG1	DATAA36	AJ22	DATAB25	R30	DATAB78	D22	VOIDATA3	D15	VOIDATA56
AF1	DATAA37	AJ20	DATAB26	U30	DATAB79	D24	VOIDATA4	D13	VOIDATA57
AD1	DATAA38	AJ19	DATAB27	W30	DATAB80	D26	VOIDATA5	D12	VOIDATA58
AB1	DATAA39	AJ17	DATAB28	Y30	DATAB81	D27	VOIDATA6	D10	VOIDATA59
Y1	DATAA40	AJ15	DATAB29	AB30	DATAB82	D28	VOIDATA7	D6	VOIDATA60
W1	DATAA41	AJ13	DATAB30	AD30	DATAB83	E31	VOIDATA8	D5	VOIDATA61
U1	DATAA42	AJ12	DATAB31	AF30	DATAB84	F31	VOIDATA9	E4	VOIDATA62
R1	DATAA43	AJ10	DATAB32	AG30	DATAB85	H31	VOIDATA10	F4	VOIDATA63
N1	DATAA44	AJ8	DATAB33	AK27	DATAB86	K31	VOIDATA11		
M1	DATAA45	AJ6	DATAB34	AK26	DATAB87	M31	VOIDATA12		
K1	DATAA46	AJ5	DATAB35	AK24	DATAB88	N31	VOIDATA13		
H1	DATAA47	AG2	DATAB36	AK22	DATAB89	R31	VOIDATA14		

Figure A.4. Data Voter FPGA Pinout




Figure A.5. PROM Memory Block




Figure A.6. KRAM and SRAM0 Segments of SRAM Memory Block






Figure A.7 SRAM1 and SRAM2 Segments of SRAM Memory Block




Figure A.8 SRAM3 Segment of SRAM Memory Block

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## APPENDIX B. PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC DESIGN EQUATIONS

When programming the programmable devices such as PLDs and FPGAs, equations must be written that define the signals to be generated when input signals are applied to the devices. The PLD programming equations are based on paper design rather than actually being compiled and simulated. However, the FPGA programming equations were compiled and simulated using the Xilinx Foundation Series Design Suite. Section 1 contains the programming equations for PLDs and Section 2 contains the programming equations for the Address/Control Voter FPGA.

In the following equations, a dot (.) means a logical AND operation, a plus (+) means a logical OR operation and an exclamation mark (!) means a logical NOT operation.

### 1. PLD Programming Equations

$$\text{RdRdy}^* = \text{CYCEND}^* \cdot \text{RdRdy}^* + \text{!ValidOut}^*$$

$$\text{WrRdy}^* = \text{CYCEND}^* \cdot \text{WrRdy}^* + \text{!ValidOut}^*$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CYCEND}^* = & \text{!(RESET}^* \cdot (\text{RD} \cdot \text{CNTR}==7 + \text{!EPROMCS}^* \cdot \text{RD} \cdot \text{CNTR}==10 \\ & \text{WR} \cdot \text{CNTR}==6 + \text{CNTR}==\text{F}) ) \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{ValidIn}^* = \text{!(RESET}^* \cdot (\text{RD} \cdot \text{CNTR}==7 + \text{!EPROMCS}^* \cdot \text{RD} \cdot \text{CNTR}==10) )$$

$$\text{WRENA}^* = \text{!(RESET}^* \cdot \text{WR} \cdot \text{CNTR}==6)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{WRENB}^* = & \text{!(RESET}^* \cdot (\text{VOTCTRL2} + \text{VOTCTRL1} + \text{VOTCTRL0}) \cdot \text{WR} \cdot \\ & \text{CNTR}==6) \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{WRENC}^* = \text{!(RESET}^* \cdot (\text{VOTCTRL2} + \text{VOTCTRL1}) \cdot \text{WR} \cdot \text{CNTR}==6)$$

WREND\* = !(RESET\* . (VOTCTRL2 + VOTCTRL1 . VOTCTRL0) . WR .  
CNTR==6)

WRENE\* = !( RESET\* . VOTCTRL2 . WR . CNTR==6)

WRENF\* = !( RESET\* . ( !VOTCTRL2 + !VOTCTRL1 . !VOTCTRL0 ) . WR .  
CNTR==6)

WRENG\* = !( RESET\* . ( !VOTCTRL2 + !VOTCTRL1 ) . WR . CNTR==6)

WRENH\* = !( RESET\* . ( !VOTCTRL2 + !VOTCTRL1 + !VOTCTRL0 ) . WR .  
CNTR==6)

## 2. FPGA Programming Equations

RD = !VOTCTRL7 . !VOTCTRL6 . !VOTCTRL5

WR = !VOTCTRL7 . VOTCTRL6 . !VOTCTRL5

RDEN\* = !( RESET\* . CYCEND\* . !VOTCTRL7 . !VOTCTRL6 . !VOTCTRL5)

WRDATAEN\* = RESET\* . CYCEND\* . VOTCTRL8 . !VOTCTRL7 .  
!VOTCTRL6 . !VOTCTRL5

## APPENDIX C. XILINX FOUNDATION SERIES FPGA DESIGN

The FPGAs also need to be programmed just like the PLDs. However, schematic diagrams were used to program the FPGAs instead of writing the programming code in ABEL or Verilog because the Xilinx Foundation Series FPGA design tool offered schematic programming of the FPGAs. The designer can enter the design in schematic format and the tool converts it to a netlist and compiles to get the FPGA programming code. Section 1 of this appendix presents the schematics for the Address/Control Voter FPGA and Section 2 presents the schematics for the Data Voter FPGA.

### 1. Address/Control Voter FPGA

The design schematics of the Address/Control Voter FPGA are presented in the following figures and Table C.1 lists the figures and the pages they appear on.


Figure Number and Description	Page
Figure C.1. Address Voter/Memory Decoder Section of Address/Control Voter FPGA	88
Figure C.2. Control Voter Section of Address/Control Voter FPGA	89
Figure C.3. Memory Interface Section of Address/Control Voter FPGA	90
Figure C.4. 4-bit Wide Majority Voter Macro (VOTER4)	91
Figure C.5. One 30-bit Address Bus Input Macro	92
Figure C.6 Voted Address Bus Output Macro	93
Figure C.7 9-bit Wide Majority Voter Macro (VOTER9)	94
Figure C.8 9-bit System Command (Control) Bus Input Macro	95



88


Figure C.2. Control Voter Section of Address/Control Voter FPGA






Xilinx Corporation	Project: DCTRLVTR
2100 Logic Drive	Macro: DATACTRLVTR
San Jose, CA 95124	Date: 6/28/00
Date Last Modified: 3/12/01	

Figure C.3. Memory Interface Section of Address/Control Voter FPGA



Project: ADO1171  
 Macro: VOTER4  
 Date: 8/27/00

Figure C.4. 4-bit Wide Majority Voter Macro (VOTER4)



Xilinx Corporation	Project: ADDRVTTR
2100 Logic Drive	Macro: INBUSA
San Jose, CA 95124	Date: 6/27/00
Date Last Modified:	

Figure C.5. One 30-bit Address Bus Input Macro





Figure C.6 Voted Address Bus Output Macro



94



Xilinx Corporation  
 2100 Logie Drive  
 San Jose, CA 95124  
 Date Last Modified: 12/3/00

Figure C.8 9-bit System Command (Control) Bus Input Macro

## 2. Data Voter FPGA

The design schematics of the Data Voter FPGA are presented in the following figures and Table C.2 lists the figures and the pages they appear on.

Figure Number and Description	Page
Figure C.9. Top Level Schematic of Data Voter FPGA	97
Figure C.10. One 64-bit Data Bus Input Macro	98
Figure C.11. 64-bit Voted Data Bus Output Macro	99
Figure C.12. 16-bit Wide Majority Voter Macro (VOTER16)	100

Figure C.9. Top Level Schematic of Data Voter FPGA






Figure C.10. One 64-bit Data Bus Input Macro



99




Figure C.12. 16-bit Wide Majority Voter Macro (VOTER16)

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